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Abstract
Background: The multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm is a cognitive task
that requires parallel tracking of several identical, moving objects following
nongoal-directed, arbitrary motion trajectories. Aims: The current study aimed
to investigate the employment of prediction processes during MOT. As an
indicator for the involvement of prediction processes, we targeted the human
premotor cortex (PM). The PM has been repeatedly implicated to serve the
internal modeling of future actions and action effects, as well as purely percep-
tual events, by means of predictive feedforward functions. Materials and
methods: Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), BOLD activa-
tions recorded during MOT were contrasted with those recorded during the
execution of a cognitive control task that used an identical stimulus display and
demanded similar attentional load. A particular effort was made to identify and
exclude previously found activation in the PM-adjacent frontal eye fields (FEF).
Results: We replicated prior results, revealing occipitotemporal, parietal, and
frontal areas to be engaged in MOT. Discussion: The activation in frontal areas
is interpreted to originate from dorsal and ventral premotor cortices. The
results are discussed in light of our assumption that MOT engages prediction
processes. Conclusion: We propose that our results provide first clues that
MOT does not only involve visuospatial perception and attention processes,
but prediction processes as well.
Introduction
During visual perception, sensory input is constantly dis-
rupted due to eye blinks, saccadic eye movements, and
outside world occluders. As a consequence, there is a per-
petual loss of visual information, particularly critical
during the observation of moving entities. Yet, the human
brain manages well to compensate this information loss,
for example, sustaining object identities through (brief)
occlusions during the attentive tracking of moving objects
(Scholl and Pylyshyn 1999; Franconeri et al. 2006). It has
been suggested that identity correspondence is maintained
based on information regarding object surface features
and spatiotemporal continuity (e.g., Hollingworth and
Franconeri 2009; also see below).
In the multiple object tracking (MOT) paradigm, partic-
ipants have to keep track of several moving targets among
a similar number of moving distractor objects. These
objects (targets and distractors) do not bear any distin-
guishing characteristics except for different (premotion)
starting locations. Thus, target identities are maintained
through the continuous processing of spatiotemporal
information, constantly updating target locations. In this
study, we raise the question of whether past and current
spatiotemporal target characteristics are used to extrapo-
late future target locations via sensorimotor prediction
processes.
The human premotor cortex (PM) has been implicated
to be a key neural substrate for the prediction of motor
acts (e.g., Stadler et al. 2011) and dynamic perceptual
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events (Wolfensteller et al. 2007). Accordingly, we
expected the PM to be engaged during MOT. In the fol-
lowing sections, we will thoroughly introduce the MOT
paradigm, illustrate the role of the PM in sensorimotor
prediction, and reflect on previous experimental evidence
speaking in favor of the employment of prediction pro-
cesses during MOT. We will conclude the Introduction
with our hypothesis and experimental rationale.
MOT paradigm
The MOT paradigm is a cognitive task originally devel-
oped to study visual attention (Pylyshyn and Storm
1988), targeting the question of whether several identical,
moving objects can be tracked in parallel despite the find-
ing of one locus of visual attention (Posner et al. 1980).
A typical MOT task has the following characteristic (see
Fig. 1): participants see a small sample of objects (e.g.,
eight circles). In the target presentation period, a subset of
these objects (e.g., four) is marked as targets. Subse-
quently, all objects are indistinguishable and move around
the screen during the motion period that lasts, for
instance, 10 s. Object motion is usually constrained to a
predetermined subarea of the screen, the motion area.
After the motion has stopped, participants are asked to
identify the targets (target identification period).
As demonstrated repeatedly, humans can reliably track
up to four or five objects (Pylyshyn and Storm 1988;
Scholl and Pylyshyn 1999; Scholl et al. 2001). Tracking
performance is modulated by a number of factors deter-
mining cognitive demands, such as object velocity
(Alvarez and Franconeri 2007), number of nontargets
(Sears and Pylyshyn 2000), length of motion period
(Pylyshyn 2004), and visual angle of the overall display
(Intriligator and Cavanagh 2001).
Motion trajectories are typically rendered based on an
algorithm resulting in “Brownian motion like” object
motion (cf. Pylyshyn and Storm 1988; “Brownian
motion” is a term used in physical chemistry to describe
the movement of particles in suspension, resulting from
collisions with rapidly moving atoms or molecules). There
are restrictions regarding sudden and large velocity
changes (a factor referred to as object inertia, Pylyshyn
2004), giving object motion a certain appearance of “bio-
logicity.” Moreover, motion trajectories are affected by
object “behavior”: in the incidence of intersection, two
objects can overlap with each other (Pylyshyn 2004),
bounce off each other (Bahrami 2003), or go round each
other (Alvarez and Franconeri 2007). Such constraints
restrict the set of possible spatial coordinates to which an
object can proceed from one frame to another. However,
from the remaining set, coordinates are usually chosen in
an arbitrary manner, yielding essentially unpredictable
object motion.
Cognitive processes during MOT
Behavioral results on MOT cannot readily be explained
by “spotlight” theories of attention (Posner 1980). Rather,
Yantis (1992) found empirical evidence that target objects
are “grouped,” that is, cognitively represented as if
belonging to one virtual object. During tracking, instead
of continuously shifting the locus of attention back and
forth between objects, target identity is supposedly main-
tained via a holistic representation in the form of said
virtual object.
Furthermore, Pylyshyn and Storm (1988) suggested that
object identity is maintained through “mental reference
tokens.” In an early stage of visual perception, salient
objects in a visual display can be “indexed,” a mechanism
that individuates and keeps track of said objects without
the necessity to categorize or conceptualize them (Pylyshyn
2001). On a similar notion, Kahneman and colleagues sug-
gested the existence of object files, that is, temporary visual
representations of real world objects (Kahneman and
Treisman 1984; Kahneman et al. 1992). Object files store
information on object surface features, such as shape or
texture, and spatiotemporal characteristics (Mitroff and
Alvarez 2007). Depending on their availability and reliabil-
ity in a given situation, both types of information can be
used to maintain object correspondence in the incidence of
Figure 1. Depicted is the course of a trial in a typical MOT task (e.g.,
Pylyshyn and Storm 1988). Participants see a small number of objects
(e.g., eight circles). (A) In the target presentation period, a subset of
these objects (e.g., four) is marked as targets. (B) In the motion
period, markings are erased, rendering objects identical in
appearance. All objects move about the screen for a short period of
time, for example, 10 sec, usually constrained to a predetermined
motion area. (C) In the subsequent target identification period,
participants are asked to identify the targets.
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brief occlusions of an observed moving object, (Holling-
worth and Franconeri 2009; Papenmeier et al. in press).
However, in situations where no distinguishing surface
information is available (such as in the MOT paradigm),
spatiotemporal information appears to be of key signifi-
cance to the maintenance of object file representations.
Indeed, while random changes in object shape or object
color did not impair tracking performance (Bahrami 2003;
unless, for instance, targets and distractors swapped colors
during occlusion, see Huff et al. 2011), the manipulation
of spatiotemporal information did lead to tracking impair-
ment (Franconeri et al. 2006; also see below). Furthermore,
object trajectories have been demonstrated to be a crucial
parameter in target-distractor discrimination. When the
MOT movement algorithm was altered in a way that
resulted in an interdependence of target and distractor tra-
jectories (e.g., “behaving” as if chasing each other), track-
ing performance declined significantly (Suganuma and
Yokosawa 2006).
Importantly, we propose that object identity is not only
sustained based on past motion trajectories, but that
spatiotemporal information is also used as a feedforward
function. Should our assumption hold true, then predic-
tion processes should be indicated by PM activation dur-
ing MOT, as will be elaborated in the following section.
Prediction processes and the PM
The premotor cortex, as its name implicates, is crucially
involved in the planning and preparation of motor acts
(for a meta-analysis, see Grezes and Decety 2001). Inter-
estingly, some parts of the PM (particularly those located
in the inferior frontal gyrus [IFG]), not only show
involvement in processes of action control, but during
the observation of motor acts as well (Rizzolatti and
Craighero 2004). During action observation, these areas
have been suggested to translate visual codes into action
codes, providing a neurophysiological link between visual
perception and action control (Rizzolatti et al. 2001;
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2010). More precisely, it appears
that prediction processes, as employed during action con-
trol (e.g., generating short-term templates of expected
sensory consequences of an action, see Schubotz 2007),
are also exploited during action perception (Blakemore
and Decety 2001).
Importantly, there is accumulating evidence that PM
activation reflects the simulation and prediction of yet to
be performed actions (Schubotz and von Cramon 2004;
Stadler et al. 2011, 2012). Such “emulations” of others’
actions (Schubotz 2007) are not necessarily limited to an
observer’s ability to reproduce the observed or predicted
action with their own motor system, nor do the observed
actions have to be of human origin in the first place
(Cross et al. 2011a,b). Rather, Schubotz (2007) proposed
that said emulations are used “by default in a simulation
mode for predictions of observable events of any kind as
long as they take place within several seconds” (Schubotz
2007, p. 211; italics added for emphasis). That is, even in
the absence of motor requirements, the PM functions as
an “internal forward model of environmental dynamics”
(Schubotz and von Cramon 2003, p. S124), modeling
dynamic sensory patterns based on sequential event char-
acteristics (Schubotz and von Cramon 2003, 2004;
Schubotz 2007; Wolfensteller et al. 2007).
The following section will review previous experimental
evidence that, we argue, speaks in favor of the employ-
ment of prediction processes and PM involvement during
MOT.
MOT, sensorimotor prediction, and the PM
In a behavioral MOT study, Franconeri et al. (2006)
manipulated the location of object reappearance after
object motion had been briefly occluded. Tracking perfor-
mance was impaired when objects exited the occluder at
unexpected locations (e.g., shifted by several object diam-
eters on the vertical axis). Similarly, Graf et al. (2007)
modulated the continuity perception of human move-
ment with another occluder paradigm. Watching short
sequences of familiar actions, participants’ task was to
detect changes in specific movement parameters after
occlusion. Behavioral performance varied as a function of
the degree to which occluder length matched the time
gap in the occluded movement (both systematically
manipulated), with highest performance for perfect
matches. That is, in both studies (Franconeri et al. 2006;
Graf et al. 2007), the manipulation of spatiotemporal
parameters of an observed motion hampered motion
perception. The results by Graf et al. (2007) have been
taken to demonstrate real-time simulation of observed
actions. As a consequence, experimental alterations of the
observed actions led to violations of anticipated visuospa-
tial input. We propose that the findings by Franconeri
et al. (2006) were based on similar cognitive processes.
Furthermore, Stadler et al. (2011) conducted a functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, adopting
the Graf occlusion paradigm. The authors compared
brain activation elicited by a simulation task to brain acti-
vation evoked by cognitive control tasks, for example, a
memory task. Results suggest significantly more (left
hemispheric) dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) activation
during the employment of prediction processes in the
occluder phase, compared to other cognitive mechanisms
(e.g., memory processes).
In another behavioral study, Trick et al. (2006) found
interferences between MOT and action execution. Subjects
ª 2013 The Authors. Brain and Behavior published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 685
S. Atmaca et al. Involvement of PM in MOT
performed (1) a standard MOT task, (2) a standard MOT
task while additionally performing three-finger tapping
sequences, (3) a standard MOT task while additionally
articulating three-syllable sequences. MOT performance
was significantly more impaired during additional finger
tapping, suggesting that finger tapping and object tracking
share cognitive resources and respective neural substrates,
possibly the PM. In a meta-analysis, Schubotz and von
Cramon (2003) studied activation patterns in the PM
during performance of cognitive tasks demanding object-
related attention (e.g., observation and denotation of
familiar tools, Grafton et al. 1997), rhythm-related atten-
tion (e.g., detection of rhythm violations, Schubotz and
von Cramon 2001), and spatial attention (e.g., trajectory
predictions of single moving dots, Chaminade et al.
2001). The authors found that spatial attention rather
elicited activation in dorsal parts of the PM (PMd), while
rhythm and object-related attention rather elicited activa-
tion in ventral parts of the PM (PMv). The same meta-
analysis discussed somatotopic activation patterns of the
PM, revealing PMd involvement in eye movement con-
trol, and PMv involvement in execution, observation and
imagery of hand and finger movements (Buccino et al.
2001; Schubotz and von Cramon 2003; Schubotz 2007).
Such task- and body part-specific activations could
explain why MOT was affected by finger tapping: because
the brain regions (presumably subregions of the PM) that
are engaged in the planning of rhythmic, spatially defined
actions (assuming that tapping sequences are spatially
coded), as well as the execution of these actions by means
of finger and concomitant eye movements, are also
engaged in MOT.
Previous fMRI studies have investigated brain activa-
tion during MOT (Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovicich
et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009). All four studies compared
an MOT condition (subjects had to track a subset of 2–5
out of 8–10 objects) with a passive viewing condition
(moving circles without tracking instruction), revealing
several loci of activation in the parietal cortex, such as the
anterior and the posterior intraparietal sulcus and the
superior parietal lobule. Importantly, the contrast
[MOT > passive viewing] also showed activation in fron-
tal regions, namely in the dorsolateral frontal cortex
(DLFC; Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Howe et al. 2009).
Furthermore, there was activation associated with tracking
load (increasing activation with increasing number of
tracked objects) in the left inferior precentral sulcus
(Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001).
Activations in the DLFC have been interpreted to refer
to the frontal eye fields (FEF). FEF are crucially involved
in oculomotor control (Paus 1996) and processes of spa-
tial attention (Corbetta 1998; also see Discussion for a
review of FEF involvement). Activation in the FEF was
thus attributed to generation and suppression of involun-
tary eye movements and attention shifts during MOT
(Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Howe et al. 2009). Further-
more, Jovicich et al. (2001) interpreted activation in the
DLFC to represent an area they named “primary motor
area,” assumed to reflect motor preparations prior to exe-
cuting a response in form of a button press. Indeed,
MOT required a response in the end of each trial, passive
viewing did not (Jovicich et al. 2001). The authors
discussed that this activation in the primary motor area
might have concealed activation in the adjacent FEF. In
turn, we propose that activation in the DLFC, as has been
found by all four studies, refers to the FEF-adjacent PMd,
partly concealed by FEF activation. Similarly, we propose
that previously found activation in the inferior precentral
sulcus (Culham et al. 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001) indicates
involvement of the PMv, possibly reflecting sensorimotor
prediction processes.
That is, in accordance with previous behavioral results
(Franconeri et al. 2006; Trick et al. 2006) and found
brain activation maxima (Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovic-
ich et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009), we expected activation
in the DLFC during MOT. Such brain activation would be
in accordance with (yet no definite proof of) the recruit-
ment of prediction processes during MOT.
Hypothesis and experimental approach
In the current study, we aimed to provide first evidence
for the employment of sensorimotor prediction processes
during the parallel tracking of several identical objects
following arbitrary motion trajectories (MOT paradigm).
We operated under the rationale that prediction processes
should be reflected by premotor activation during MOT.
While potential findings of activation in the DLFC would
neither allow for the inevitable conclusion of PM involve-
ment, nor for this PM involvement to be an indicator of
prediction processes, we took experimental measures to
smooth the way for a respective result interpretation.
In order to test our hypothesis, we adopted a standard
MOT task (Pylyshyn and Storm 1988) where participants
had to track either two or three out of eight identical
objects (for a detailed description, see Methods section).
As control condition, we implemented a cognitive task
that allowed application of identically the same stimulus
material in both conditions, with an initial cue signaling
which task to execute. With this experimental design, we
ensured identical visual input and minimized differences
between MOT and control condition in regard to level of
vigilance and attentional load. We also circumvented the
problem of response preparation as a source of premotor
activation (Jovicich et al. 2001), as a response was
required in both conditions.
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As described above, previous fMRI studies on MOT
(Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001; Howe
et al. 2009) found increased activation in the DLFC. This
activation was interpreted to originate from the FEF, a
region anatomically adjacent to PMd (Paus 1996; Schu-
botz and von Cramon 2001). Since a major concern was
the dissociation between the FEF and the PM, we sought
to considerably reduce later confusions regarding the ori-
gin of potential activations. To that end, we (1) con-
ducted a behavioral prescreening and selected participants
with minimal eye movements, and (2) functionally local-
ized the FEF and later masked the main contrast (MC)
with localizer activation.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited via the subject pool of the
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain
Sciences (MPI-CBS) in Leipzig, Germany. Out of 23 that
took part in a prescreening (procedure described below),
the 13 participants with the least eye movements and
concomitant highest behavioral performance were invited
to participate in the fMRI scanning. The data of two
participants were later removed from further analyses due
to error rates of >25% during fMRI scanning. The
remaining 11 participants ranged in age from 22 to 33
(mean age 26.9 years, three female).
Experimental conditions: MOT and
luminance changes
Stimuli
Stimuli featured eight identical objects (white squares,
roughly 0.2° of visual angle) and a centrally positioned fix-
ation cross (roughly 0.2° of visual angle). In the motion
period (see below, Course of trials), these objects moved
around for 6000 msec in an arbitrary fashion, confined by
the motion area, a gray square in the center of the com-
puter screen (roughly 7° of visual angle). Motion trajecto-
ries were calculated online. The motion algorithm was
based on the one used by Sears and Pylyshyn (2000).
Objects moved at a predetermined, constant velocity. In
order to avoid ambiguities in respect to object identities,
some restrictions were put into place regarding “object
behavior” (Pylyshyn and Storm 1988). Should an object
collide with the border of the motion area, the fixation
cross, or another object, it “bounced off,” reversing the
perpendicular component of its velocity. This procedure
led to abstract and arbitrary object motion, resembling
“Brownian motion” (Sears and Pylyshyn 2000; also see
above, “MOT paradigm”). In addition, objects simulta-
neously underwent 2–6 luminance changes (LUM) during
the motion period. Each luminance change lasted for
500 msec, with a minimum of 300 msec between two
changes. Note that these stimulus characteristics (object
motion, LUM) were precisely the same for both conditions.
MOT condition
Participants had to track a subset of either two or three
out of the eight identical objects throughout the motion
period (representing difficulty level 1 and 2, respectively).
Luminance changes (LUM condition)
As control condition, participants were asked to count
the number of LUM. Luminance values (8-bit grayscale)
changed either from 255 to 210 (difficulty level 1), or
from 255 to 220 (difficulty level 2), with the latter being
less salient und thus representing a higher degree of diffi-
culty.
Course of trials
(1) In the initial target presentation period, objects appeared
in a random position within the motion area, with the
restriction that they must not be directly adjacent to or
overlap with the border of the motion area, the fixation
cross, or another object. The target presentation period
functioned as a task cue. Either a subset or all objects were
“marked,” that is, they changed color from white to red.
Marking two or three of the eight objects indicated that in
the following motion period, the marked objects had to be
tracked (MOT condition). When all eight objects were
marked, participants had to count LUM (LUM condition).
Markings lasted throughout the duration of the target pre-
sentation period, which was jittered (1750, 2000, 2250,
2500, 3000 msec). Subsequently, there was a short still per-
iod of 1000 msec where participants saw the same display
of eight objects without the markings. (2) In the following
motion period, objects were indistinguishable and moved
around within the motion area for 6000 msec while
simultaneously undergoing several changes in luminance.
(3) After the motion had stopped, a solution was presented
for 2000 msec (target identification period). In the MOT
condition, a subset of objects was marked, corresponding
to the number of targets in the respective trial. Participants
had to indicate via button presses whether the marked
objects were targets or not. In 50% of cases, the offered
solution was incorrect, differing by one object from correct
target identities. In the LUM condition, the fixation cross
was replaced by an Arabic digit. Participants had to
indicate via button presses whether the presented number
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equaled the number of LUM or not. In 50% of cases, the
offered solution was incorrect, differing by (+/) one from
correct number of LUM. There were intertrial intervals
(ITIs) of 4000 msec.
FEF localizer task
Previous studies have associated the FEF with oculomotor
control and shifts in spatial attention during visual process-
ing (Anderson et al. 1994; Paus 1996; Corbetta 1998;
Pierrot-Deseilligny et al. 2004). Accordingly, in order to
localize participants’ FEF, we implemented an FEF localizer
(FEF-L; cf. Garg et al. 2007). The display featured the same
motion area (roughly 7° of visual angle) and fixation cross
(roughly 0.2° of visual angle) as MOT and LUM. Fixation
periods (FIX) alternated with saccade periods (SACC), last-
ing 15 sec, respectively. During FIX, the fixation cross was
presented centrally. During SACC, the fixation cross
randomly appeared in one of the four corners of the
motion area, changing location in 1500 msec intervals. Par-
ticipants’ task was to rapidly move their eyes toward the
location of appearance. Such exogenous, visually guided
saccades comply with eye movements that might occur
during MOT despite the instruction to fixate the centrally
presented cross. That is, with the specific design of the FEF-
L task, we aimed to elicit FEF activation associated with eye
movements that bear characteristics similar to those possi-
bly occurring during MOT (also see Discussion below).
Experimental Procedure
Both prescreening and fMRI-recording took place at
MPI-CBS. All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, gave written consent, and received mone-
tary reward for their participation.
Prescreening
Aiming to confine eye movements during the experiment
in order to reduce FEF involvement to a minimum, we
conducted a behavioral prescreening. During MOT,
participants’ eye movements were recorded using a
remote corneal reflection eye tracker (Tobii 1750, Stock-
holm, Sweden; software ClearView 2.7.1; sampling rate:
50 Hz). Participant selection was then based on both
behavioral performance and the occurrence of saccades.
fMRI scanning
During scanning, participants attended to 100 trials of
stimuli (50 MOT, 50 LUM), presented at 25 frames per
second (60 Hz refresh rate) with a resolution of
1024 9 768 pixels. The software “Presentation” (Neuro-
behavioral SystemsTM, Albany, CA) was used for stimulus
presentation and response recording. Using a back projec-
tion system, stimuli were displayed above participants’
eyes via a mirror reflecting an LCD projection onto a
screen placed behind the magnet. Including all measured
sequences, scanning time did not exceed 50 min.
fMRI data acquisition and analysis
fMRI data acquisition
Functional images were acquired on a 3T BRUKER Med-
Spec 30/100 system (Bruker Corporation, Billerica, MA),
equipped with a standard birdcage head coil. Functional
images were collected with a single shot gradient echo-
planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following param-
eters: echo time TE = 25 msec, flip angle 90°, repetition
time TR = 2000 msec, acquisition bandwidth 100 kHz.
Twenty-six axial slices were taken in an interleaved
fashion (pixel matrix = 64 9 64 and in-plane resolu-
tion = 3 9 3 mm, resulting in a field of view of 19.2 cm,
a slice thickness of 4 mm, and an interslice gap of 1mm),
oriented parallel to the bicommissural plane (AC-PC).
The total number of functional scans collected per partic-
ipant was 780 for the experimental conditions and 233
for the FEF-L. Additionally, three-dimensional (3D) high-
resolution whole brain images were acquired from each
subject (MP-RAGE sequence, 160 slices, 1 mm thickness)
in a separate session on a 3T Siemens MAGNETOM TIM
Trio (Siemens AG, Munich and Berlin, Germany), used
to align the functional data slices onto a 3D stereotactic
coordinate reference system.
fMRI data preprocessing
All fMRI data analyses were carried out using the SPM8
software package (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, London, U.K.) with Matlab 7 (Mathworks,
Natick, MA). After EPI volumes were corrected for
motion, distortion, and slice timing, they were realigned,
unwarped, normalized to the Montreal Neurological Insti-
tute (MNI) template (3 9 3 9 3 mm resolution), and
spatially smoothed (8 mm).
fMRI data first-level analysis
Each motion period (time between end of still period and
beginning of target identification period, see above) was
modeled as a boxcar spanning the length of 6000 msec,
convolved with the standard hemodynamic response
function, representing activation during MOT and LUM,
respectively. Accordingly, a design matrix was fitted with
regressors for MOT and LUM. Trials that showed errone-
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ous behavioral performance were modeled just as regular
MOT and LUM trials, yet labeled as JUNK. JUNK and
BASELINE (modeled as a boxcar spanning the duration
of 4000 msec ITIs) entered the analysis as additional
regressors. For first-level analysis, contrast images were
computed combining the parameter estimates of the cor-
responding experimental conditions (MOT, LUM).
For the FEF-L, a design matrix was fitted with regres-
sors for FIX and SACC, each modeled as a boxcar with a
duration of 15 s and convolved with the standard hemo-
dynamic response function. Computing contrast images
combining the parameter estimates of FIX and SACC,
effects of the two regressors were compared to each other
resulting in FEF-L activation. This was done on the group
level due to the circumstance that individual subjects
showed large variations in activation strength. While a
few outliers did not show any frontal activation related to
the FEF-L with the current analysis parameters, in other
participants, changing the significance level to a value
higher than Puncorrected < 0.001 resulted in such massive
brain activation that it no longer could be called mean-
ingful. However, we did not feel comfortable with apply-
ing different analysis parameters to different participants.
As a consequence, we performed the analyses on the
group level, reasoning that, by following this more con-
servative way, we would end up excluding rather too
much activation as being FEF related than not enough.
fMRI data second-level analysis
For group analysis, said contrast images were fed into one-
sample t-tests, testing found between-condition differences
against zero (Holmes and Friston 1998). The main contrast
(MC) examined differences in activation maxima between
the conditions MOT and LUM, [MOT > LUM]. The FEF-
L mask was acquired by computing the contrast between
SACC and FIX, [SACC > FIX]. FEF-L was used as an
exclusive mask to eliminate activation related to oculomo-
tor control and stimulus-driven attention shifts from the
MC. Both contrasts were evaluated in whole brain analyses.
The MC was evaluated at the Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 10 vo-
xel threshold. Only results that reached a significance level of
PFDR-corrected < 0.001 (i.e., corrected for false-discovery rate)
will be discussed below. Note that exceptions were made for
two clusters that were deemed particularly worthy to be
discussed in light of the current study, despite the fact that
they did not reach PFDR-corrected < 0.001. The FEF-L mask
was evaluated at the Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 0 voxel thresh-
old. We intentionally set the voxel threshold as low as possi-
ble in order to ensure that no FEF activation would be
dismissed. The resulting activations were saved as an image
file, and used to be applied as an exclusive mask to the MC.
Coordinates of found brain activations and corresponding
anatomical structures are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
Brain activations were anatomically localized with aid of
SPM8’s Anatomy Toolbox (Eickhoff et al. 2005), double
checked, and corrected (where applicable) by expert neu-
roanatomist D. V. M. Ott, M.D. (coauthor to this
paper).
Results
Behavioral results
As behavioral performance, we compared number of
correct responses out of 25 per condition: MOT2 (mean:
23.10; SD: 1.92), MOT3 (mean: 22.36; SD: 1.43), LUM1
(mean: 23.18; SD: 1.89), and LUM2 (mean: 22.09; SD:
2.91). A within-subjects 2 9 2 analysis of variance (ANO-
VA) with the factors Condition (MOT vs. LUM) and
Task Difficulty (Level 1 vs. Level 2) was computed on the
amount of correct responses. There was a significant main
effect for the factor Task Difficulty, F(1,10) = 6.780,
P < 0.05, indicating that our manipulation of task
difficulty worked as intended. Neither the main effect
for the factor Condition (F(1,10) = 0.018, P = 0.895)
nor the two-way interaction of Condition 9 Task Diffi-
culty (F(1,10) = 0.151, P = 0.706) reached significance,
indicating that comparable cognitive demands were
required by MOT and LUM and that task difficulty did
not depend on condition.
Imaging results
MC: main effect of condition [MOT > LUM]
In order to reveal brain activation specific to the MOT task,
we contrasted the MOT condition with detection of LUM
(LUM condition). To disentangle activation related to eye
movement control from task specific activation, FEF-L was
applied as an exclusive mask. Following this procedure, the
MC, [MOT > LUM] (excl. FEF-L), revealed bilateral fron-
tal activations (Fig. 2), namely in the precentral gyrus, the
precentral sulcus, the pars opercularis of IFG, and the left
superior frontal gyrus. Furthermore, we found bilateral
activation maxima in the middle temporal gyrus and the
superior temporal gyrus, as well as in the right supramar-
ginal gyrus, and the right middle occipital gyrus, and
various activations throughout the brain that will not be
further discussed. See Tables 1 and 2 for all activation max-
ima of the MC and the FEF-L mask, respectively.
Discussion
Proposing that MOT employs sensorimotor prediction
processes, this study investigated the recruitment of the
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DLFC (presumably the PM), taken as a neural correlate
of predicting dynamic events during object tracking.
Previous brain imaging studies on MOT (Culham et al.
1998, 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009)
focused on neural substrates of visuospatial attention,
attentional load, spatial memory, and cognitive tagging of
individual objects. These studies found a network of acti-
vations, dominantly in the parietal and the frontal cortic-
es. Shedding light on these results from the perspective of
a prediction framework, we propose that frontal activa-
tions found in said earlier studies (previously interpreted
to refer to the FEF, attributed to oculomotor control and
spatial attention) overlapped with prediction-related acti-
vation in adjacent parts of the PM. The current study
aimed to provide preliminary evidence for this account.
In order to achieve this goal, our study had the follow-
ing characteristics: (1) we developed a control condition
(LUM) in a manner that allowed the application of iden-
tical visual input in both MOT and LUM conditions. The
Table 1. Effects of simultaneous tracking of two and three objects
(average).
H AR x y z cs t
R *Middle temporal gyrus 54 55 13 3770 12.84
R *Supramarginal gyrus 45 31 43 11.85
R *Middle occipital gyrus 42 73 25 10.10
L *Precentral gyrus (BA6) 15 10 67 414 8.82
L *Superior frontal gyrus
(BA6)
21 5 49 8.73
L *Precentral sulcus (BA6) 21 7 55 8.55
R *Precentral gyrus (BA6) 21 10 61 305 9.01
R *Precentral sulcus (BA6) 18 7 52 7.94
R *Precentral gyrus (BA6) 33 10 58 7.92
L Cerebellum 15 52 50 240 7.65
L Cerebellum 42 43 29 7.45
L Fusiform gyrus 27 43 14 7.06
R Precentral gyrus, pars
opercularis of IFG (BA44)
51 5 31 55 6.19
R Precentral gyrus, pars
opercularis of IFG (BA44)
54 2 22 5.26
R N/A 33 2 17 55 8.37
R Olfactory cortex 18 11 20 5.28
L Superior temporal gyrus 57 19 4 36 7.54
R Fusiform gyrus 30 31 23 33 5.77
R Parahippocampal gyrus 27 25 23 5.66
L Anterior cingulate cortex 3 11 25 32 6.11
R N/A 12 23 19 5.82
R N/A 6 14 22 5.04
R Superior temporal gyrus 42 28 10 27 7.41
L Cerebellum 18 64 17 26 5.49
L Cerebellum 21 67 20 5.37
R Mid orbital gyrus 9 50 11 25 5.00
R N/A 18 47 8 4.84
L Olfactory cortex 6 11 17 23 5.39
R N/A 3 2 14 4.90
R Temporal pole 48 17 17 23 6.22
R N/A 24 17 10 20 5.09
R N/A 21 49 22 19 5.96
L N/A 15 28 34 18 7.44
L Precentral gyrus, pars
opercularis of IFG (BA44)
51 5 25 18 5.76
R N/A 36 1 1 16 4.93
R Fusiform gyrus 33 43 11 12 4.75
R Cerebellum 12 73 50 12 5.79
L N/A 57 8 17 11 5.03
L Middle temporal gyrus 60 1 17 4.51
In a whole brain analysis, evaluated at Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 10 vo-
xel threshold, we compared brain activation during multiple object
tracking (MOT) with brain activation elicited by the control condition
(detection of LUM). For the main contrast, [MOT > LUM] was masked
with activation of the FEF localizer (FEF-L, for activation maxima, see
Table 2). Table 1 lists the found brain activation maxima for
[MOT > LUM] (exl. FEF-L). H, Hemisphere; AR, anatomical region
according to SPM’s Anatomy Toolbox Probability Maps, if applicable
corrected by expert neuroanatomist and coauthor D. V. M. Ott, M.D.;
BA, brodmann area; x/y/z, MNI coordinates; cs, cluster size; t, T-value;
IFG, inferior frontal gyrus.
*Results that reached a significance level of PFDR-corrected < 0.001.
Table 2. Effects of visually guided oculomotor control (FEF localizer
task).
H AR x y z cs t
R *SPL, precuneus 9 61 58 358 9.73
R *Superior parietal lobule 18 67 52 7.85
R *Superior parietal lobule 24 58 55 7.34
R *Inferior parietal lobule 33 43 49 6.66
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 27 52 52 251 8.02
L Superior parietal lobule 18 61 55 7.84
L Precuneus 12 70 49 5.64
L Calcarine gyrus 12 82 4 238 8.33
R Calcarine gyrus 9 82 4 6.91
R Superior frontal gyrus 24 4 52 137 7.63
R Precentral gyrus 42 4 49 6.86
R Middle occipital gyrus 33 76 31 113 7.20
R Middle occipital gyrus 33 73 19 6.38
L Precentral gyrus 27 4 61 77 6.07
L Precentral gyrus 30 7 58 5.99
L Cerebellum 33 46 50 23 5.89
L Cerebellum 15 55 47 9 6.28
R Superior temporal gyrus 57 40 19 7 4.74
R Supramarginal gyrus 66 31 25 4 4.92
R Middle temporal gyrus 57 43 7 4 4.48
L Inferior parietal lobule 45 37 40 3 4.44
R Middle occipital gyrus 42 79 1 3 4.42
R Inferior occipital gyrus 39 82 2 4.25
L Cerebellum 42 55 35 2 4.31
In a whole brain analysis, evaluated at Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 0 voxel
threshold, we compared brain activation during saccade execution
compared to brain activation during fixation [SACC > FIX]. The result-
ing activation maxima of this FEF localizer (FEF-L), as listed in Table 2,
were applied as an exclusive mask to [MOT > LUM]. H, hemisphere;
AR, anatomical region according to SPM’s Anatomy Toolbox Probabil-
ity Maps; x/y/z, MNI coordinates; cs, cluster size; t, T-value; FEF, fron-
tal eye fields.
*Results that reached a significance level of PFDR-corrected < 0.001.
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only difference between conditions was an initial task cue
that did not enter the imaging analysis. (2) By asking par-
ticipants to detect LUM as control condition, we inten-
tionally designed a cognitive task that demanded to direct
attention to the moving objects while allowing to disre-
gard their trajectories. (3) Responses were required in
both conditions, addressing the issue of activation in the
DLFC due to response preparation (Jovicich et al. 2001).
(4) We went to great lengths to identify and exclude FEF
activation. Aside from stressing the importance to fixate
on the fixation cross in order to reduce eye movements
to a minimum, we conducted a prescreening that allowed
us to select participants exhibiting the least visually
guided saccades during MOT and LUM. Additionally, we
functionally located participants’ FEF by recording brain
activation during saccade execution (FEF-L). FEF-L was
later applied as an exclusive mask to the MC.
Results overview
Activations in the lateral frontal cortex
Corresponding to our hypothesis, the MC revealed bilat-
eral frontal activation in BA6 comprising the precentral
(A)
(B)
Figure 2. (A) Brains are seen from three different angles. Left: side view of the left hemisphere. Middle: dorsal view (neurological convention) of
both hemispheres, with the anterior side of the brain pointing upwards. Right: side view of the right hemisphere. All three brains depict regions
that were more activated during MOT compared to LUM, [MOT > LUM] (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 10 voxel), while FEF-L (Puncorrected < 0.001,
k = 0 voxel) was applied as an exclusive mask. [MOT > LUM] (excl. FEF-L) revealed frontal activations in BA6 (PFDR-corrected < 0.001), comprising
the precentral gyrus (bilaterally), the precentral sulcus (bilaterally), as well as the left superior frontal gyrus (possibly merging into BA8). These
activations in BA6 are assumed to refer to the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd, marked in blue). Further frontal activations were found bilaterally in
BA44, in the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), assumed to reflect involvement of the ventral premotor cortex (PMv, marked in
pink). Furthermore, a large cluster spreading bilaterally through the temporal, parietal, and occipital cortices was revealed, with activation maxima
in the superior and middle temporal gyri (bilaterally), the supramarginal gyrus (right hemisphere), and the middle occipital gyrus (right
hemisphere). For coordinates of all activation maxima, see Table 1. (B) All three brains are seen from the dorsal view (neurological convention),
with the anterior side of the brain pointing upwards. Left: Brain activations during performance of the FEF-L task. Depicted are those regions that
were more activated during saccade execution compared to fixation, [SACC > FIX] (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 0 voxel), also referred to as the “FEF-
L mask” (for coordinates of activation maxima, see Table 2). Middle: Depicted are two contrasts, [MOT > LUM] (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 10 voxel)
in red and the FEF-L mask (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 0 voxel) in purple. Brain regions that showed activations in both contrasts are represented in
lilac. Right: Depicted are only those brain regions that showed activations in both contrasts, [MOT > LUM] (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 10 voxel) and
the FEF-L mask (Puncorrected < 0.001, k = 0 voxel). Color brightness is not mapped to activation intensity, but corresponds to the locations of
activations. The more transparent an activation, the more distant it is from the brain surface.
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gyri and the precentral sulci, as well as left superior fron-
tal gyrus (possibly merging into BA8), with the following
cluster maxima (MNI, x/y/z): 15/10/67 and 21/10/61
(also see Table 1 and Fig. 2). As a rule of thumb, the
threshold between the dorsal and the ventral PM lies in
the range of z-coordinates 48–51 in Talairach space
(Schubotz and von Cramon 2003; Tomassini et al. 2007),
corresponding to approximately z = 43 to 46 in MNI
space. Thus, we propose that this activation represents
the involvement of premotor areas, namely the PMd.
Noteworthy, further activations were found bilaterally in
BA44 (pars opercularis of the IFG) with the following
cluster maxima: 51/5/31 and 51/5/25 (also see Table 1
and Fig. 2). Even though these results did not reach the
significance level of PFDR-corrected < 0.001, these activations
are of most interest to the current study, as we take them
to reflect PMv involvement. Below, we will discuss these
assumptions and speculate on the implications of our
interpretations.
Activations in the temporal and parietal cortices
The MC revealed an extended activation cluster with local
maxima in the superior and middle temporal gyri (bilat-
eral), the right middle occipital gyrus, and the right
supramarginal gyrus. This cluster spreads bilaterally
through large parts of the parietal cortex (comprising the
superior and inferior parietal lobules) and the occipital
cortex (Table 1).
Similar parietal activations were found in previous studies
(Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001; Howe et al.
2009). This area is generally associated with processes of spa-
tial attention, for instance, governing attention shifts toward
salient sensory input (Goodale and Milner 1992; Cabeza
et al. 2008, 2011; Hutchinson et al. 2009; Sack 2009). The
parietal cortex also comprises the parietal eye fields that are
crucially involved in the execution of “reflexive” saccades
toward salient objects in a visual scene (Rushworth et al.
2003; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al. 2004). Furthermore, the infe-
rior parietal lobule, together with the IFG, has been associ-
ated with the embodiment of observed actions (Cross et al.
2009). On a similar note, parietofrontal circuits have been
implicated to be involved in action planning and control by
means of visuospatial and somatosensory representations
(Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000; Lamm et al. 2007; Willems
et al. 2009), even during nonmotor visuospatial mental oper-
ations, for example, mental rotations (Lamm et al. 2001).
Interestingly, previous brain imaging studies have not
reported MOT-related activations in the temporal cortex
that would resemble our findings. The superior temporal
gyrus and sulcus have been associated with the attribution
of animacy and mental states (Castelli et al. 2000). For
instance, Schultz et al. (2004, 2005) used stimulus
displays featuring abstract objects (geometrical shapes)
that moved in an apparently self-propelled manner. The
authors manipulated object “behavior” to give the
impression of an “interaction” between two objects. They
found activations in the superior and middle temporal
gyrus in association with a high degree of attributed
intentionality. We found activation maxima similar to
those reported by Schultz and colleagues (our maxima:
54/55/13, 57/19/4, 42/28/10; Schultz et al. 2004:
48/44/12, 60/56/4, 56/30/4; Schultz et al. 2005:
39/57/22; 60/27/9). However, with the current
experimental design, we cannot determine whether or not
our participants may have attributed animacy and/or
intentionality to the moving objects. Thus, the signifi-
cance of our findings remains to be resolved by future
studies.
In the following sections, we will focus our discussion
on the activations in our area of interest, the frontal cortex.
Dorsal and ventral premotor activations
In accordance with our hypothesis, we found activation
maxima in BA6 and BA44. We assume that these activa-
tions reflect the involvement of the dorsal and ventral pre-
motor cortices (PMd, PMv). The following sections will
reflect on this assumption from anatomical and functional
perspectives. Importantly, premotor activations would be
in line with the idea of recruitment of prediction processes
during MOT. However, alternative result interpretations
will be addressed, namely processes of oculomotor control
and visuospatial attention as the source of DLFC activa-
tion. We will conclude with speculations regarding the
functional implications of our findings.
Functional boundaries of FEF versus PMd
Based on our finding of activation in the DLFC, the
important question arises whether this activation can be
attributed to the PMd, possibly representing prediction
processes as hypothesized, or whether it should be rather
attributed to FEF involvement governing oculomotor
control. As the PMd and the FEF are adjacent (or even
overlapping) brain structures (Melamed and Larsen 1979;
Petit et al. 1996; Schubotz and von Cramon 2001; Ptak
and Schnider 2011), this question cannot be easily
answered based on anatomical parameters. To tackle this
issue, we implemented the FEF-L, as described above. Fol-
lowing this procedure, we sought to functionally identify
brain activations referring to eye movements. Another
function that has been associated with FEF activation is
processes of spatial attention (Corbetta 1998; Zacks et al.
2001). In an effort to exclude brain regions associated
with these functions, we contrasted MOT against a
692 ª 2013 The Authors. Brain and Behavior published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Involvement of PM in MOT S. Atmaca et al.
control condition (LUM) that was designed as to engross
similar cognitive resources (in regard to vigilance and
attentional load) as MOT, as will be discussed below.
Oculomotor control and the DLFC
Oculomotor control during visual processing is often
divided into two categories, referring to the origin of their
initiation. Accordingly, eye movements can be labeled as
endogenous (goal directed, cued, under top-down control,
according to instruction) and exogenous (visually guided,
noncued, under bottom-up control, stimulus driven). The
involvement of the FEF in the execution of endogenous
versus exogenous saccades has been subject to discussion
(e.g., Anderson et al. 1994; Paus 1996; Pierrot-Deseilligny
et al. 2004; Neggers et al. 2012).
By excluding FEF-L related activation from the MC, we
sought to erase potential DLFC activation that might have
been evoked by “accidentally executed” eye movements
during MOT (i.e., despite the instruction to fixate on the
fixation cross). Eye movements elicited by the FEF-L task
were strongly exogenously driven (i.e., they were per-
formed rapidly in response to target presentation).
Accordingly, the application of the exclusive FEF-L mask
to the MC removed possible brain activation associated
with potential exogenous eye movements during MOT.
Thus, any residual brain activation related to oculomotor
control would point toward the occurrence of endoge-
nous saccades during MOT. Indeed, while eye movements
in the FEF-L task also bore some characteristics of endog-
enous saccades (i.e., there was a raised level of vigilance
toward the appearance of targets in one of four possible
locations), we cannot exclude the possibility that MOT
elicited significantly more endogenous eye movements.
Interestingly, one could argue, the execution of endoge-
nous saccades toward a moving object would require a
minimum degree of extrapolation of current object loca-
tions into the immediate future (and would thus support
our prediction account). However, it is very unlikely (if
at all) that accidental saccades in the MOT condition
have occurred in a systematic manner such that they
would have produced any contrast of relevance. In other
words, they would have been prone to be eliminated as
“noise” in the analyses. We are thus confident that nei-
ther exogenous nor endogenous saccades can account for
the found DLFC activation.
Frontal eye fields activation has also been associated
with continuous eye movements during smooth pursuit of
target objects. Even so, we feel safe to exclude the occur-
rence of continuous eye movements, because Jovicich et al.
(2001), who also conducted eye tracking during MOT,
found no evidence of smooth pursuit, and neither did we
during our behavioral prescreening.
However, the absence of saccade occurrences during
MOT might point toward the employment of saccade
inhibition processes (e.g., Culham et al. 1998). The signifi-
cance of the FEF for the inhibition of exogenous, visually
guided saccades has been a matter of debate. While there
have been studies suggesting the FEF to be crucially
involved in oculomotor-related inhibitory processes
(Connolly et al. 2000; Kimmig et al. 2001; Pierrot-Deseil-
ligny et al. 2004), it is noteworthy that the inhibition of
exogenous saccades is usually measured by means of the
“antisaccade paradigm.” This paradigm requires the per-
formance of saccades toward the direction opposite to the
locus of appearance of a visual object. Thus, result inter-
pretation regarding the neural substrates of saccade inhi-
bition based on this paradigm, where saccade suppression
(toward the target), computation of the target’s mirror
position, and saccade execution (toward said mirror posi-
tion) are confounded, is problematic. In line with this
reasoning, there have been clinical findings painting a less
clear picture of FEF involvement in inhibitory oculomo-
tor control (Gaymard et al. 1999). A paradigm allowing
for a more valid comparison with assumed eye movement
inhibition in our MOT task would be saccade suppression
during fixation with concurrently appearing peripheral
visual stimuli. Neggers et al. (2012) tested this paradigm,
the contrast of [Fixation with Peripheral Stimuli > Fixation
without Peripheral Stimuli] revealing the following activa-
tion maxima (MNI, x/y/z): 38/6/52, 52/0/38, 44/2/
52. As these activations are at the most tangentially overlap-
ping with the activations found in the DLFC in our MC
(maxima: 15/10/67, 21/10/61), we are confident that
our allegedly found PMd activation did not originate from
oculomotor suppression during visual fixation.
Spatial attention and the DLFC
Aside from oculomotor control, prior fMRI studies on
MOT attributed activation in the DLFC to spatial atten-
tion during visual search (Culham et al. 1998, 2001;
Jovicich et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009). Indeed, brain acti-
vation related to spatial attention has been previously
ascribed to the FEF (Corbetta 1998; Zacks et al. 2001),
suggesting a strong link between the government of spa-
tial attention and oculomotor control (“premotor theory
of attention,” Rizzolatti et al. 1987). Other studies that
found activation in the DLFC during the performance of
spatial attention tasks have implicated the PMd as the
region of origin. Boussaoud (2001), for instance, sug-
gested that there are two subdivisions of the PMd, a ros-
tral and a caudal part, that are rather distinct in regard to
their functionality. While the caudal part appeared to be
primarily involved in movement planning, the rostral part
seemed to be mainly associated with the maintenance of
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spatial stimulus representations (Simon et al. 2002). Yet,
arguably, the distinction between rostral PMd and poster-
ior FEF cannot easily be made. In order to avoid a discus-
sion of whether brain activation related to spatial
attention originated in the PMd or the FEF, we are going
to focus on functionality and use the term “areas in
DLFC associated with spatial attention” (ADSA) in the
following sections.
Aiming to address the issue of brain activation in the
ADSA during MOT, we implemented a control condition
(LUM). LUM required paying attention to the moving
objects while disregarding their trajectories, as opposed to
previous fMRI studies on MOT that used passive viewing
control conditions (Culham et al. 1998, 2001; Jovicich
et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009). That is, in both conditions,
participants had to attend to peripherally presented visual
stimuli, and both conditions featured the same amount of
objects that moved around in the same visual field (the
motion area, roughly 7° of visual angle). As a conse-
quence, we can assume that processes of spatial attention
are considerably involved in both tasks. Thus, by con-
trasting MOT against LUM, we should have accounted
for respective activation in the ADSA.
It is possible, though, that the two conditions differed
in regard to spatial attentional load. While behavioral per-
formance did not statistically differ, we cannot rule out
this possibility. Rather, it appears to be intuitive to
assume that MOT required more spatial attentional
resources than LUM. However, Jovicich et al. (2001),
who explicitly used the MOT paradigm in order to
manipulate attentional load, did not find any load-related
activations in the DLFC. That is, while possible differ-
ences in attentional load may have been manifest in other
parts of the brain, we claim that it is unlikely that they
can account for the activations in our target area.
A more specific component of spatial attention that
might have elicited different amounts of ADSA activation
in MOT compared to LUM is shifts in spatial attention.
Just as eye movement control, attention shifts can be cat-
egorized as endogenous, goal directed and exogenous,
sensory guided. The extent to which the ADSA are
involved in both categories of spatial attention shifts is
still under debate. For instance, Ptak and Schnider (2011)
suggested that the ADSA are involved in both exogenous
and endogenous attention shifts, whereas Corbetta and
Shulman (2002) and Corbetta et al. (2005) claimed that
the ADSA are rather responsible for endogenous, goal-
directed attention shifts. In any case, remember that in
the FEF-L task, upcoming target locations were visually
guided (noncued), thus evoking exogenous shifts of atten-
tion. That is, after applying the exclusive FEF-L mask,
any remaining attention-related activation in the MC can
be ascribed to endogenous, goal-directed shifts in spatial
attention. This interpretation would be in accordance
with Yantis (1992), who proposed that maintenance of
target identities is managed through top-down attention
processes.
Interestingly, endogenous attention shifts and sensori-
motor prediction processes are similar functional concepts
(Bubic et al. 2010), insofar that they both act as internal
generators bridging spatiotemporal information acquired
in the immediate past (during exposure to the stimulus
material) to current (and future) spatiotemporal stimulus
characteristics. What remains to be resolved is the
conceptual relation between the two. Is it possible that
they are less separate processes as it might appear at first
look? One approach to this question would be a critical
review of cognitive tasks previously used to measure spa-
tial attention shifts. What aspects of spatial attention were
targeted with the respective tasks? To what extent might
they have incorporated spatiotemporal extrapolation of
target locations? Put differently, is it even possible to
develop a cognitive paradigm able to disentangle pro-
cesses of spatiotemporal prediction and spatial attention?
Are the latter not rather a prerequisite for the former?
Unfortunately, these questions go way beyond the lim-
its of the current study and will need to be addressed by
future research. Importantly, if present, residual ADSA
activation in the MC attributed to endogenous attention
shifts would not contradict our idea that MOT involves
cognitive mechanisms that provide internally guided (as
opposed to externally triggered) processing of spatiotem-
poral information. However, the presence of such residual
ADSA activation is highly speculative as we cannot deter-
mine if and how FEF-L, LUM, and MOT differed in
respect to endogenous attention shifts.
Taken together, we propose that, after contrasting
against LUM activation and subtracting FEF-L activation,
we sufficiently accounted for regions in the DLFC that
can be associated with components of oculomotor control
and spatial attention similar to those occurring during
MOT. Thus, we argue, the remaining activations in the
MC represent those regions in the DLFC that are particu-
larly involved in sensorimotor prediction, namely the
PMd.
PMd activation
As outlined in the previous section, we suggest that the
found activation maxima in the DLFC originated from
PMd, possibly reflecting the involvement of prediction
processes in MOT.
The engagement of the PM during tasks requiring the
observation and imagination of others’ actions has gained
considerable scientific attention (e.g., Grafton et al. 1997;
Schubotz and von Cramon 2001; Decety and Grezes 2006;
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Cross et al. 2009). In an fMRI study, the left PMd was
interpreted to be “a core neural driver of action simula-
tion” (Stadler et al. 2011, p. 677), for example, crucially
contributing to the prediction of common routines (such
as setting the dinner table) during 1000 msec occlusions
(Stadler et al. 2011, 2012). However, the present study is
by far not the first to associate this classic motor region
with the prediction of inanimate dynamic visual events.
For instance, the PMd has been associated with “spatially
referenced” representations of action targets (Schubotz
and von Cramon 2001, p. 98), as such serving the internal
modeling of action sequences as well as perceptual events.
Accordingly, PMd has been shown to be involved in a
number of cognitive tasks requiring internal transforma-
tions of spatially defined perceptual events, such as serial
prediction (Schubotz and von Cramon 2001), the genera-
tion of number sequences from memory (Abe et al.
2007), and mental rotation (Lamm et al. 2001; Oshio
et al. 2010).
In this context, Schubotz (2007) suggested that (inani-
mate) event prediction is modulated by characteristic
properties of the respective event, for example, “rhyth-
mic” or “spatial.” Computations of corresponding
forward models are processed in those premotor subareas
whose regular motor output most suitably fits the respec-
tive event properties. Namely, Schubotz (2007; Schubotz
and von Cramon 2003) proposed that prediction of
spatially defined events is processed in dorsal premotor
regions involved in reaching movements, while “object-
defined events” are simulated by ventral premotor areas
associated with grasping movements. Inanimate events are
likely modulated by more than one salient property. Con-
sequently, most inanimate events will evoke activations in
more than one premotor subarea, as appears to be the
case in the current study. Accordingly, we argue, the
found PMd activation corresponds to the spatial emphasis
of MOT.
PMv activation
The MC revealed bilateral activation in the pars opercu-
laris of the IFG (BA44). This brain region has been most
prominently associated with language production. How-
ever, recent research has also linked the pars opercularis
to the processing of observed motor aspects (Rizzolatti
and Craighero 2004). As a result, some authors have sug-
gested that PMv extends from ventral BA6 into dorsal
BA44 (Schubotz and von Cramon 2002, 2003; Schubotz
et al. 2003; Binkofski and Buccino 2006).
BA44 has been argued to be the putative human homo-
logue of the monkey premotor area F5 (Petrides et al.
2005) in which so-called “mirror neurons” were observed
(Gallese et al. 1996). It appears that neurons in this area
code sensorimotor representations, presumably in a
modality-independent way (Bremmer et al. 2001). Inter-
estingly, in monkeys, these neurons also fire when action
goals (e.g., object contact as the goal of a reach-to-grasp
movement) are occluded (Umilta et al. 2001), indicating
their predictive capacities. Similarly, it has been suggested
that, together with BA6 and parietal areas (BA2), human
BA44 is part of right hemisphere pathways that, aside
from multisensory processing, are assumed to provide
forward models based on somatosensory representations
and sensorimotor consequences of planned or simulated
actions (Wolpert and Ghahramani 2000; Lamm et al.
2007; Willems et al. 2009).
Furthermore, the human opercular part is often associ-
ated with complex and abstract action-related cognition.
Such forms of action representations are, for instance,
required for multilimb coordination in complex move-
ments (Swinnen et al. 2010), as well as during the obser-
vation of such movements (Calvo-Merino et al. 2006;
Cross et al. 2006). Abstract action representations involve
the encoding of complex rules for spatiotemporal organi-
zation among movements of single limbs. Moreover, pars
opercularis in the left hemisphere has been demonstrated
to be engaged in chunking, enabling the construction of
hierarchical structures in language and mathematics
(Makuuchi et al. 2012). Thus, functions of the opercular
part are recruited not only during action production and
observation, but also in cognitive tasks that require the
establishment of complex rules for spatiotemporal organi-
zation. Accordingly, it can be speculated that the bilateral
activation in pars opercularis found in the MC reflects
the occurrence of rule detection, enabling mental repre-
sentations of spatial relations between the tracked objects.
Such mental representations may, for instance, involve
the structuring of spatial information into chunks.
Indeed, Yantis (1992) found empirical evidence suggesting
that participants in an MOT task showed forthwith men-
tal grouping of targets as if they belonged to one bigger
object (also see above, Cognitive processes during MOT).
When maintenance of such a cognitive representation was
experimentally disrupted, tracking performance was
impaired.
Activation in the inferior frontal cortex has been previ-
ously associated with MOT (Culham et al. 1998), more
precisely with parametric tracking effects (Culham et al.
2001; Jovicich et al. 2001). In order to test for MOT-
specific load components, we conducted an explorative
analysis, comparing brain activation during the tracking
of three compared to two objects, [MOT3 > MOT2]
(Puncorrected < 0.05; voxel threshold k = 10). In an attempt
to control for activation related to general attentional
load, we applied activation of the contrast
[LUM2 > LUM1] (Puncorrected < 0.05; voxel threshold
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k = 10) as an exclusive mask. This procedure revealed
activation in the pars opercularis of the right IFG (cluster
maximum in MNI, x/y/z: 51/8/28). The lack of a more
pronounced MOT-specific load activation can be attrib-
uted to the fact that we had only two levels of difficulty.
Jovicich et al. (2001), for instance, found a linear increase
of activation in the inferior precentral sulcus (possibly
referring to BA44) with increasing number of two to five
tracked objects. In contrast, our manipulation of task dif-
ficulty might not have been powerful enough to yield
more significant brain activations associated with MOT-
specific processing load.
However, note that these speculations are based on the
assumption that we did manage to account for activations
due to attentional load by contrasting against LUM.
While we did not find statistical differences in behavioral
performance in MOT compared to LUM, it has to be
acknowledged that the amount of correct answers might
not be an ideal measure for attentional load. Rather,
MOT might have strained attention processes to a differ-
ent extent than LUM. Thus, attentional load elicited by
MOT, as suggested by Jovicich et al. (2001), remains a
reasonable explanation for the found activations in the
pars opercularis. Future studies will have to address this
issue.
Implications of PM activation
“Predictions that allow one to anticipate features such as
the movements of objects and the behaviors of other ani-
mals are of great adaptive benefit” (Zacks et al. 2011, p.
4057). More precisely, predictions of dynamic perceptual
events are a prerequisite for goal-directed manipulations
of and beneficial reactions to social and physical environ-
ments. For instance, only through the prediction of
biological movements are we able to successfully engage in
cooperative or competitive interactions with conspecifics.
Against this background, let us consider a tangible
example to understand the real world significance of the
abstract MOT paradigm. Picture a herd of animals. A
predator observing the herd is keen to single out and
keep track of its weakest member. From the observer’s
perspective, this individual animal, as it trots about, is
repeatedly occluded by trees, rocks, or other animals. Its
bodily outline is in constant change while it adjusts its
movement directions. Changes in lighting can lead to
variations in optical refractions, resulting in the animal’s
fur to be perceived in different colors. Transferring this
scene to the MOT paradigm, behavioral results suggest
that the human brain is well adapted to compensate for
such fluctuations in visual input during tracking (Scholl
and Pylyshyn 1999; Bahrami 2003). Importantly, in the
presence of nondiscriminatory or ambiguous object
surface features, the continuity of target identities appears
to strongly rely on spatiotemporal information, such as
motion trajectories (Franconeri et al. 2006). We propose
that motion trajectories are not only processed up to the
point of current target locations, but that their future
courses are extrapolated via sensorimotor anticipation
processes (Chaminade et al. 2001).
Previous brain imaging studies provided evidence of
the PM to be a neural correlate of the prediction of
familiar human actions (Stadler et al. 2011, 2012) and
inanimate events (Schubotz 2007; Wolfensteller et al.
2007). Accordingly, PM activations in the current study
are in line with the idea that sensorimotor prediction
processes were also recruited during MOT. This finding
could indicate that, during the parallel tracking of inani-
mate entities performing arbitrary motions, prediction
processes are employed similar to those used to pursue
and anticipate goal-directed movements of biological
agents. Although this interpretation is pure speculation at
this point, this would not be the first study to report PM
activation during the prediction of unfamiliar, arbitrary
movement. Cross et al. (2011a), for instance, found PM
involvement when participants were asked to predict con-
tinuations of action sequences that did not match their
own motor expertise (gymnastic sequences). This was also
true for predictions of inanimate toy movements (wind-
up toys, Cross et al. 2011a).
At first glance, the employment of prediction processes
during (rather “unpredictable”) nonbiological, arbitrary
perceptual events might appear maladaptive, as they are
bound to lead to guesswork. Yet, only through such ini-
tial guesswork can a feedback process be launched (Van
der Stigchel et al. 2009) that has the potential to eventu-
ally lead to the acquisition of new (predictive) sensorimo-
tor experience (cf. Cross et al. 2006). Thus, we suggest
that the human brain’s tendency to employ prediction
processes, even during the observation of unfamiliar, arbi-
trary, or nongoal-directed movements (cf. Cross et al.
2006, 2011a,b), is of vital adaptive advantage (cf. Bubic
et al. 2010).
Summary
The current study aimed to investigate the recruitment of
prediction processes during the tracking of abstract
objects following arbitrary motion trajectories (MOT;
Pylyshyn and Storm 1988). We operated under the
assumption that prediction processes should be reflected
by PM activation, as the PM has been previously demon-
strated to be significantly involved in predictions of per-
ceptual and motor events (Schubotz and von Cramon
2004; Schubotz 2007; Wolfensteller et al. 2007; Stadler
et al. 2011, 2012).
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Recording fMR-images during the performance of an
MOT task, we replicated previous results (Culham et al.
1998, 2001; Jovicich et al. 2001; Howe et al. 2009), reveal-
ing activations in occipitotemporal, parietal, and frontal
areas. We claim that the found activations in the frontal
cortex represent the dorsal and ventral premotor cortices.
Importantly, though the role of cognitive resources other
than prediction processes cannot be exhaustively deter-
mined, we made an effort to develop an experimental
design that – to a considerable extent – was able to
account for frontal activations associated with oculomotor
control and spatial attention processes.
To conclude, we propose that the found activations in
the PM point toward a signature of sensorimotor predic-
tions of motion trajectories during MOT.
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